Real customer cases.
Real bugs their scanners missed.

A simple “notes” box at checkout. Harmless on the store itself. But staff see that note later in their dashboard, and there it runs as live code, not text.

Our AI placed a normal-looking order with hidden code in the note. Hours later a staff member opened it, the code ran inside their account, and the attacker took over: a new admin login, and control of pricing and payouts.

A stored XSS the scanner never caught.

Not just “you have a bug.” We showed the exact page at fault, the one-line fix, and how to block anything like it in future, with steps a developer can replay in 5 minutes.

The app checked that you were logged in. It never checked that the data you asked for was actually yours.

Our AI signed up as a brand-new customer, then changed one number in the web address to someone else's. Their full record came back. We confirmed it from two accounts at once.

A broken access control flaw, also called IDOR.

One missing check: before the app hands over a record, confirm it belongs to the person asking. We showed exactly where it was missing, with a re-test for every release.

The sign-in request quietly carried the one-time code that was meant to be emailed to you. The app trusted whatever code it was handed.

Our AI put its own code on the request and told the app it was correct. It logged us in as another user, with no password and no access to their inbox.

An account takeover, with no credentials at all.

We pointed to the exact field the server must stop trusting, explained why it was reachable, and handed over a five-minute test to confirm the door was shut.

Admin-only features were taken off the menu for normal users, so everyone assumed they were locked. But hidden is not the same as protected. Once a request left the browser, nothing ever asked again who had sent it.

Our AI signed in as an ordinary user, worked out what that account was meant to be able to do, then asked the app to run the admin-only actions anyway. It ran them. Adding and removing users, changing settings, privileged actions, all from an account that should never have got near them.

A broken function-level authorization flaw, also called BFLA.

We listed every admin action that answered a normal user, the one check each of them was missing, and the single place to enforce it for all of them, with a re-test a developer can run on every release.

The page showed two boxes, but the save accepted any field you cared to send with it. One of the fields it accepted, and never displayed, was the one that decides whether you are an administrator.

Our AI saved its own profile the normal way, with one extra field attached. Before the save, the admin pages turned it away. After the save, they opened. Same account, same button, nothing in between but an edit to its own profile.

A mass-assignment flaw, ending in full admin access.

We named the exact field the server must stop accepting, the short list of fields it should accept instead, and the before-and-after steps a developer can replay in five minutes to watch the escalation close.